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Abstract
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) will play a
key role in future economic and social strategies in
South Africa. However, we find that SMEs are par-
ticularly vulnerable to shocks in their external envi-
ronment due to a general lack of skills and
resources. This is critical as the future demand for
electricity in South Africa is likely to outstrip supply
and electricity will become increasingly unreliable
and expensive. We surveyed 250 SMEs in Cape
Town and found that the prevailing policy methods
of changing electricity consumption behaviour:
information campaigns, increasing prices, and pro-
viding rebates for energy savings, have had limited
results and are unsustainable when applied to
SMEs. 
Keywords: Small and medium enterprises, electric-
ity supply, electricity crisis, Cape Town, consump-
tion
Introduction
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are regarded
as particularly important to South Africa at its cur-
rent stage of development according to the South
African Government’s Accelerated and Shared
Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA) (South
Africa, 2006). SMEs are relied on as the future
engines of growth for the South African economy
and a method to bring the informal economy clos-
er to the formal economy, bring women and youth
into the mainstream of the economy and advance
broad-based black economic empowerment (South
African Government, 2006; Department of Trade
and Industry, 2006). However, SMEs are one of the
most vulnerable sectors to an unstable environment
and policy shifts. Unlike larger businesses, SMEs
generally lack the resources necessary to invest in
alternative sources of energy and they generally do
not have the in-house capabilities for sound asset
management.
A small enterprise in South Africa is defined as
employing fewer than 50 staff, while a medium
enterprise is considered to have fewer than 200 by
the South African Small Business Act (South Africa,
1996). SMEs contribute between 45 and 50% of
South Africa’s GDP and employ more than 50% of
all formally employed in South Africa (Business
Owner, 2006). The South African Government’s
future growth policy and industrial policies rely
heavily on the future growth of this sector; howev-
er, SMEs are far more vulnerable to volatility in the
macro-economic environment. SMEs are particu-
larly vulnerable during expansion phases and are
less likely to have in-house capabilities for sound
asset and risk management. This was illustrated
starkly in the 2006 Cape Town electricity crisis.
The state of electricity supply in South
Africa
A reliable, abundant, low priced source of electrici-
ty is critical to the success of the business sector in
South Africa, and it has enjoyed one of the lowest
priced electricity supplies in the world. Constraints
are, however, starting to impact on the South
African business environment. Environmental con-
straints, a lack of availability of low priced primary
energy sources, and increased construction costs for
new power stations are all adding pressure to elec-
tricity prices. The efficient use of energy is therefore
an important issue that consumers will need to
embrace in order to constrain future price increases,
which in turn, will require a change in consumption
behaviour by consumers. 
South Africa is a developing nation, and has
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grown its economy through manufacturing and
mining, which are traditionally energy intensive
industries. Despite it having some of the cheapest
electricity supplies, South African use of energy has
not been particularly efficient. Figure 1 below illus-
trates that South Africa has progressively used more
energy to produce a US$ of GDP and also more
energy per capita in the time period 1971 to 2001.
This has largely been due to extensive use of South
Africa’s abundant and low-priced coal reserves
(Department of Minerals and Energy, 2005).
(TPES = Total primary energy supply / GDPPPP = Gross
domestic product purchasing price parity)
(toe = tones of oil equivalent)
Figure 1: South Africa: changes in the energy
required to produce 1US$ of GDP and energy
per capit a (IEA, 2006)
The demand for electricity is likely to outstrip
supply in the near future and Eskom, the parastatal
electricity utility, is facing problems with supplying
power at peak times on very cold days, in the
evenings and mornings when large amounts of
power are drawn. This is likely to get worse as
urbanization and economic growth increase. One
part of the solution is to build more power stations,
either coal or nuclear, which in turn, may create
environmental problems that will increase the price
of electricity. 
In March 2005 the Department of Minerals and
Energy (DME) put out an energy efficiency strategy
for South Africa (Department of Minerals and
Energy, 2005) intended to achieve a 12% improve-
ment in energy efficiency by 2015 set as a target in
2003 (DME, 2003). This is based on a ‘business as
usual’ baseline scenario for South Africa, i.e. popu-
lation growth rate of 1.3% p.a. (2000 = 44 million
population; 2015 = 53 million population) and
GDP growth of 2.8% p.a. The projections have
been found to be somewhat conservative and GDP
growth has been higher than projected, with conse-
quences such as the electricity crisis that hit the city
of Cape Town in 2006. Those hardest hit were
entrepreneurs and small businesses. 
The Cape Town electricity crisis
Due to a series of unfortunate events, the Cape
Town region experienced an electricity crisis in
2006, and this was compounded by the economic
growth in the region and resulted in demand out-
stripping supply. The electricity crisis began in
November 2005 with failure of switchgear followed
by a series of compounding incidents, including a
fire under a power line, a tripped transformer and a
damaged generator that resulted from a misplaced
bolt. One of the units also had to be shut down for
routine maintenance during this period. 
Cape Town suffered seven complete power out-
ages between November 2005 and January 2006,
which removed 1 326 megawatts (MW) from the
power supply, which equated to just under 50% of
the power requirements in the area. It was estimat-
ed by the Cape Town Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, following a survey of members, that the
blackouts cost the Cape Town economy about $900
million directly (Business Day, 15 April, 2006). Some
of the consequences of the blackouts were a loss of
12 days of production at the Chevron refinery
(Cape Business News, April 2006). Multinationals
that were considering investing in South Africa
openly questioned South Africa as a destination
(Business Day, 10 May, 2006) and neighbouring
countries such as Namibia, which import electricity
from South Africa were affected when South Africa
cut their supply during the crisis (Business Report,
May 2006).
There was a significant amount of confusion in
various public statements and media reports. The
CEO of Eskom reported in January that the repair
to Koeberg could take up to nine months and fur-
ther vague statements by Eskom about the causes
and duration of the blackouts created further con-
fusion in the minds of the consumer. 
Environmentalist group, Earthlife Africa, for
instance published a report that Eskom was mis-
leading the public and was not truthful because of
these vague statements (Mail & Guardian, 26
March 2006; Mail & Guardian, 30 March 2006).
During the crisis, an intensive media campaign was
adopted to try and manage the peaking power situ-
ation. Essentially, the levels of power consumption
were monitored and when consumption moved
close to a critical situation, television and radio were
used to ask the public to switch off hot water cylin-
ders, pool pumps and other appliances to bring
consumption back down to a manageable level.
The response rate to this initiative was closely mon-
itored by Eskom. Although no official report has
been published on the results of this campaign,
interviews with members of the Energy Research
Centre at the University of Cape Town and notes
from a presentation by Eskom to the South African
National Energy Association indicate that the initia-
tive had some effect. Approximately half of the tar-
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geted 400 MW was saved during the period. 
There were various reports covering the extent
of the damage to businesses and households.
Examples of this include damaged computers, traf-
fic congestion, perishables damaged in refrigerators,
non-delivery to clients, and an oil refinery unable to
operate (Cape Business News, April 2006;
PlanetArk, 2006a; PlanetArk, 2006b). Other media
reports estimated that $425 million had been spent
on the purchase of generators in Cape Town as a
result of the power cuts (Business Day, 10 May
2006). 
Literature review
Health & Sitkin (2001) believe that organizational
behavioural change has its base in individual
behaviour and there is a strong link between indi-
vidual and organizational behaviour. A change in
behaviour can more easily be expected when there
is both a positive personal attitude and a positive
personal environment. The extent to which behav-
iours can be changed by interventions in the per-
sonal domain, such as education or information,
depends on the strength of the contextual environ-
ment (Stern, 1999). Issues in the contextual envi-
ronment include public policy and economic vari-
ables. 
Crises have been shown to be an effective driv-
er of change in organizations, whether internal or
external. These crises are thought to jolt the organ-
izations to question their business strategy and in
turn their mission, structure, systems or procedures
(Bartlett 1983; Tushman et al, 1986). Organiza-
tional change not preceded by a crisis may not
always be effective or sustainable. Rumelt (1995)
states that effective organizational change is pre-
vented by distorted perception, dulled motivation,
and a failure to come up with a creative response.
Reasonable responses are not implemented
because of political deadlocks or action disconnects
and a crisis is required to overcome these frictions
and bring about change. 
The Cape Town electricity crisis is not unique
and other countries have dealt with the conse-
quences of their crises primarily by changing the
behaviour of consumers to manage demand. The
most significant crises and measures are sum-
marised in Table 1.
Lutzenhiser (1993) finds that energy consump-
tion behavioural changes are most likely to occur
when policy changes are used in conjunction with
information. In the early 1970’s consumers in the
USA largely blamed the government and other
external institutions for the energy crises of the
1970’s but attitudes had changed by the 1980’s
and 1990’s, and a majority of US households had
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Table 1: Summary of various international electricity crises 
Source: IEA (2005)
Year Country, reason for electricity crisis Measures taken to change behaviour
2001 California, series of simultaneous 200 different programs in all sectors; rebates for using less electricity 
events than the previous year; public awareness campaigns; extensive daily 
media reports; rebates for efficient appliance purchases; business 
partnerships, updated efficiency standards; higher electricity prices to 
some customers
2001 Brazil, drought Electricity rationing; penalties; media coverage of the shortage; daily 
status reports; conservation devices distributed to the poor; fuel 
switching
2001 Sweden, extremely cold day Media broadcasts for conservation and explanations of the problem
2001  New Zealand, drought Intensive media campaign; 
to and coal shortage. individual goals for all consumers; consumer hotline; website with 
2003 information; rebates for successful conservation
2002 Norway, drought and early winter Extensive media campaign; daily reservoir level reports; subsidy 
scheme for household electricity conservation; fuel switching; shut 
down some energy intensive factories
2003 Ontario blackout (for 50 million Media appeals for conservation; shutdown of government offices; 
people and 60 GW load) closure of electricity intensive industries; electricity curtailments
2003 Pennsylvania, flood damage Major industry closure; warnings of blackouts; media releases
power plant encouraging conservation
2002 Tokyo, nuclear plant shut down Media appeals for conservation; discussion programs on the problem;
individual customer visits to ask for conservation; government 
buildings conservation; rescheduling of production; website 
information; renegotiation of interruptible contracts with large 
customers
2003 Europe, hot summer Use of interruptible contacts; mass media appeals for conservation
reported that they had significantly cut back on
energy consumption. However, he finds that behav-
iour changes are also affected by factors such as
income differences, cultural backgrounds, roles
played within the organization or household, which
implies different reactions to programmes and poli-
cies to conserve energy. External factors such as
weather, social processes, design of buildings,
mechanical systems and appliances could also influ-
ence changes in behaviour.
McMakin, Malone, and Lundgren (2002) state
that there is still quite a degree of uncertainty as to
what motivates people to conserve energy. Their
study found that people are more likely to adopt a
new behaviour if it is easy and convenient to per-
form, if it fits their skills and resources, if neighbours
and friends change similarly and if commitments to
change have been made in public settings. They
propose that individuals need sufficient personal
control, self efficacy and other such self affirmation
characteristics before they can actively care enough
to take environmentally responsible actions that
benefit others (McMakin et al, 2002). 
Despite this the International Energy Agency
(IEA) recommends that energy consumption behav-
iour be changed by increasing the knowledge of the
consumer by means of media campaigns and real-
time information, rebates for energy conserved,
and higher prices for increased consumption (IEA,
2005).
Explanations of the sustainability of the changes
in behaviour are somewhat more complex. Zabel
(2005) explains that the basic approach by humans
to natural resources results in their incorrect valua-
tion. Examples of these approaches are: 
• The scarcity of natural resources is measured in
quantity and prices
• Everything can be decomposed into commodi-
ties and hence everything can be purchased
• All problems can be solved by spending money
• Natural resources are measured in terms of their
extraction costs rather than in term of their over-
all scarcity.
As a result, natural resources tend to be over-
exploited. Many of the existing social institutions,
organisations, hierarchies and reward systems pro-
mote self-interested behaviour and hamper changes
in individual value systems towards sustainability,
as they provide advantages for those individuals
that behave according to the prevailing values.
Zabel (2005) states that it can be assumed that indi-
viduals habitually carry out tests of certain values
regarding their potential dangers to the survival of
the individual or the collective survival. It is there-
fore assumed that changes in the system that influ-
ence the survival of the individual or the collective
could result in changes in behaviour. Changes in
behaviour can not really be regulated from the out-
side. In the short run, extrinsic rewards or pressures
can induce certain kinds of behaviour, but people
usually refrain from this behaviour when the exter-
nal impulse is removed. Overall, Zabel (2005) con-
cludes that people will tend to not simply change for
the sake of changing, as the rewards for unsustain-
able behaviour are too great. As a result changes in
behaviour tend to be short-term unless continually
stimulated. This is supported by the findings of the
IEA (2005) who found that normal energy con-
sumption behaviour returned once the crisis has
subsided, and this is made all the more difficult to
sustain if the change was difficult or out of control
of the individual or organization (McMakin et al,
2002).
Methodology
A Likert-type questionnaire was developed from the
literature review and sent to small and medium
businesses in the Cape Town area. The questions
were divided into three broad categories; what was
the impact of the electricity outages on SMEs, what
are the changes in behaviour, and how enduring
are these changes likely to be? Prior to the finaliza-
tion of the questionnaire it was tested with three
companies outside the sample for reliability. 
We randomly selected 2 900 of the 4 000 SMEs
who were members of the Cape Town Chamber of
Commerce for the survey. We received responses
from 250, representing a 9% response rate, which is
within the acceptable range of mail surveys
(Harzing, 1997). A breakdown of the size of the
companies, in terms of employees, is given in
Figure 2.
Figure 2: Employee complement s of
respondent comp anies
The majority (73%) of the responses came from
businesses of between 0 and 50 employees and the
remaining 16% came from companies with 51 to
300 employees. The responses came mainly from
manufacturing companies (25.2%), other (17%),
5.7% from IT businesses and 5.2% came from
finance related businesses as shown in Figure 3. 
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Impact of the electricity crisis
The impact of the electricity crisis was quite exten-
sively felt by these businesses, and most reported
loss of trade or productivity due to carrying the cost
of overheads while not trading. The majority of
SMEs (89%) are heavily dependent on a stable sup-
ply of electricity, while 69% felt that they were
severely impacted by the outages (see Figures 4 and
5). 
The overwhelming majority (80%) also felt that
they had lost business due to the lack of stable elec-
tricity. The impact is illustrated by some additional
responses: 
• Approximately $143 000 damage and losses
after equipment failure at an old age home,
• Bed and breakfast establishment lost business
from international tourists
• Fruit exporter lost $200 000 due to failure of
cold rooms
• Computer failure during critical software devel-
opment processes led to the replacement of
computers and loss of productivity
• Loss of international clients for a small manu-
facturing operation due to failure to meet dead-
lines. Estimated cost to the company was $95
000
• $15 000 to install generators in a cold-room for
a food supplier.
One way to reduce the impact of electricity out-
ages is if one has information and can plan accord-
ingly, but 68% of the respondents felt that they did
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Figure 3: Business sector of the respondent comp anies
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Figure 5: Question: My business is heavily
dependent on a stable and secure electricity
supply
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Figure 4: Question: My business was severely
financially impacted by the recent energy crisis
in Cape Town 
not have prior knowledge about the extent of the
electricity problems in Cape Town and could not
plan accordingly. This is shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Question: I was aware of the
problems with the electricity supply in Cape
Town and was therefore quite prepared for the
situation
Changes in behaviour from the electricity
crisis
The study by Lutzenhiser (1993) found that atti-
tudes towards electricity provision were an impor-
tant factor in driving the behaviour of consumers.
94% of our respondents believe that Eskom is
responsible for the provision of cheap and reliable
electricity, while 42% of respondents feel that they
need to reduce their consumption and 45% do not
– another 13% are undecided.
Actual changes in behaviour are more diverse,
and respondents were given a wide range of choic-
es and these are listed in Table 2.
The IEA (2005) recommends that changes in
electricity consumption behaviour can be driven by
information in the form of media campaigns,
increasing electricity prices, and incentives or
rebates for reduced energy consumption. 
Eskom tried to manage the electricity crisis pri-
marily through an extensive media information
campaign advising when power shedding would
occur and ways to conserve energy. In response,
only 43% of our respondents found this information
helpful, despite 57% feeling that Eskom has been
forthcoming and transparent in its attempts to pro-
vide information.
On the option of increasing electricity prices to
change electricity consumption, 47% felt that an
increase in prices would lead to their firm con-
sciously saving more electricity, while 34% strongly
disagreed and 20% were neutral. Rebates and
incentives were seen similarly with 46% of respon-
dents agreeing that rebates would assist their firms
in consuming less electricity, 27% disagreeing and
the remainder undecided.
In response to another question, 77% of the
SMEs stated that the crisis made them realize that
they are stakeholders in electricity in South Africa
and need to assist and conserve energy. However,
the permanence of the changes in consumption
behaviour is not so certain. In response to the ques-
tions on duration of change, 52% have only taken
interim measures while waiting for Eskom to restore
normal electricity supply. 29% have taken a more
long-term approach, while 19% are undecided. The
installation of alternate sources of electricity such as
solar power has been considered by a small group
of 22% and only 21% of respondents have
arranged for an energy audit. On the other hand,
60% have provided incentives or otherwise active-
ly encouraged staff to conserve energy by, for
example, turning off lights or air conditioners, and
46% have rewired some of their operations to pro-
tect equipment against power outages. Only 19%
have considered the long-term impact of unstable
electricity supply in business plans, while 31% are
Journal of Energy in Southern Africa  • Vol 19 No 1  •  February 2008 9
29.2%
12.8%
15.4%
3.6%
39.0%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
agree
Table 2: Changes in electricity consumption behaviour
Behaviours likely to change Strongly disagree Neutral/ Agree + 
+ disagree undecided strongly agree
The electricity crisis has resulted in my company having to 
reconsider future investments in South Africa 37% 36% 27%
My company will in future maintain a good working relation-
ship with Eskom to encourage a better flow of information 16% 46% 38%
Energy considerations will be a major aspect of any future 
building plans 9% 18% 73%
We will in future have to maintain on-site generators 39% 19% 43%
The crisis has resulted in building stronger relationships with 
suppliers and customers to cooperate to overcome these future 
electricity problems 24% 46% 29%
There is nothing much my company can do to improve our 
energy consumption 26% 10% 64%
Energy conservation has become a major focus point of our
future strategy 28% 38% 34%
unsure about the potential changes necessary, and
50% do not believe it will impact on their business
over the long-term.
Discussion
We have seen that unstable electricity supplies
severely threaten the survival of small and medium
enterprises. This is even more pronounced when
the businesses do not have sufficient prior knowl-
edge of the irregular outages. The major impacts on
sustainability are the loss of revenue and customers
during downtime, the failure to complete contracts
on time, and an increase in overhead and unantic-
ipated loss of productivity. 
The evidence that not many companies have
considered alternatives like solar energy could be
due to the cost and the long payback period (Mail
& Guardian, 17 March 2006). A solar water heater
could cost anywhere between $650 and $1 400.
The payback for such an item could be anywhere
between 5 and 10 years depending on usage. The
implementation of photovoltaics with batteries is
seen by respondents as expensive and still quite a
clumsy technology in comparison with grid-con-
nected power. Additional barriers for proceeding
with alternative sources of energy are more likely
due to a lack of relevant information and access to
up-front financing for the necessary infrastructure.
This is an area for further research.
Many small and medium companies have how-
ever, provided incentives to staff to behave more
conservatively in doing things like switching off
lights or air conditioning when not in use. It is inter-
esting that about one fifth of respondents haven’t
actually considered any changes in behaviour. In
exploring the reasons for these responses, the ques-
tion was asked whether short-term requirements of
shareholders were one of the reasons inhibiting
change. The response was that 20% felt it was not,
38% felt that it was and 43% were not sure. The
spread of responses is most likely the consequence
of the media information campaign conducted by
Eskom during the crisis. 
Media and information campaigns
During the crisis Eskom ran an extensive media and
information campaign to implement demand-side
management measures and avert the rolling black-
outs due to peak time power demands that could
not be met. Consumers were warned via television
and radio when power consumption in the region
was about to reach a critical level and the risk of a
blackout increased. Consumers were asked to
reduce power consumption and were informed
about when the peak power period had passed and
normal usage may be resumed. The effectiveness of
the campaign was monitored by the Energy
Institute (EI), who suggests that consumers largely
heeded the initiative (Energy Institute, October
2006). However, the ensuing political uproar over
the outages and vague reports by Eskom led to a
high degree of confusion by consumers, which is
reflected in our results where most respondents did
not find the information particularly useful. At best
this contributes to the difficulty an SME has in eval-
uating information from the external environment,
a loss of trust in the public utilities and the associat-
ed decision making problems. On the other hand,
in the period following the crisis a significant part of
the respondents feel that they are now important
stakeholders in the provision of electricity in South
Africa, but they are largely unsure what to do about
it. A disturbing finding is that a relatively large num-
ber (31%) of respondents are rethinking their
investment with implications for the future develop-
ment of the SME sector. This is an area for attention
by Government.
Increased electricity prices
As a lever of consumption-behaviour change, price
increases have a mixed chance of success. SMEs in
South Africa are generally more vulnerable to the
pressures of the market than larger firms (Falkena et
al, 2001) and increasing prices would have the
unintended consequence of inhibiting further devel-
opment of the SME sector. Additionally many
respondents felt that an increase in the electricity
price would increase overheads but not lead to
additional conservation – electricity is still a small
factor cost and it is unrealistic for it to become a
greater proportion of overhead than, for instance,
salaries. This would probably have the unintended
consequence of making these businesses economi-
cally unviable.
Incentives to change energy consumption
Significantly two thirds of the respondents felt that
there was not much that they could do to improve
their electricity consumption. This is likely related to
the size of the firm, the nature of its business, the
cost of alternatives, the lack of resources to explore
alternatives and the lack of bargaining power with
the electricity generators and suppliers. Incentives
could become a more important lever for behav-
ioural change when actively supported by govern-
ment agencies, for instance, with government pro-
viding free energy audits and involving the building
industry and appliance manufacturers to educate
consumers on energy based buying decisions.
Sustainability of behavioural changes in
electricity consumption
We do see some changes in consumption behav-
iour but the results are mixed and largely of an
interim nature. This may be attributed to the view
that the crisis was only temporary in nature, despite
Eskom’s public media campaign stating the need to
permanently change consumption behaviour (Mail
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& Guardian, 10 January 2006; Mail & Guardian,
30 March 2006). This is an attitude similar to that of
the US public in the 1970’s (Lutzenhiser, 1993) that
government and the public utility are responsible
for managing the provision of electricity in South
Africa.
Conclusions
Our findings may be limited by the size of the sam-
ple and the time frame for the study. The sample
was based on members of the Cape Town Chamber
of Commerce and Industry, and SMEs who do not
belong may be even more vulnerable to change
and capacity to plan ahead. An additional limitation
is that the study was conducted in Cape Town over
a period of four months and it would be desirable
to revisit the study later to test the permanence of
the behaviour changes. 
Despite the limitations, the Cape Town electrici-
ty crisis has taught us several lessons. The suggest-
ed methods of encouraging changes in consump-
tion behaviour; media and information campaigns,
increase prices, and the provision of incentives
(IEA, 2005) were found to have limited prospects of
success with SMEs. The SME behaviour change in
the Cape Town electricity crisis has been temporary
and does not reduce their vulnerability to future
external shocks. The most effective way to reduce
vulnerability is to provide information-certainty in
the external environment to enable SMEs to incor-
porate risk management into planning and business
processes. We recommend that an ongoing media
campaign be conducted to educate SMEs about
their vulnerability and options to reduce risk. This
should be supported by a free energy audit and
expert advice on reducing energy consumption or
managing risks from increasing electricity costs or
an unstable electricity supply. SMEs need to re-
examine their relationships and contracts with sup-
pliers and customers so that they can spread the risk
of unstable electricity supplies. This will include a
review of the type of information provided by
Eskom and channels for information. The media
campaign needs to be ongoing, not simply during
the crisis and the information needs to be trustwor-
thy, accessible and timeous. During the Cape Town
electricity crisis the information about when and
where blackouts were to occur was generally incor-
rect.
In a country like South Africa where SMEs are
seen as the major driver of economic growth, SMEs
need to be nurtured and their vulnerability reduced
– a stable electricity supply is critical in this regard.
Similarly one can conclude that unanticipated
changes to other infrastructural factors, such as
telecommunications, transport and even local
taxes, would lead to similar short-term reactions in
SME behaviour. SMEs have sense of powerlessness
to the external factors and generally do not plan for
them. SMEs tend to wait for the crisis to pass, while
not reducing their long-term vulnerability to them.
These attitudes or behaviours render the conven-
tional consensus, such as media, price increases
and incentives less effective. Future studies could
examine other strategies for changing behaviour of
SMEs as the three accepted strategies have shown
to have limited effectiveness. Another area for
research is external risk management techniques for
SMEs with their limitations on resources and skills.
A more in depth study of SMEs should be clustered
into industries, or at least into production sales or
production sectors.
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